ABSTRACT: In this paper I propose and formalize a theory of the mass-count distinction in which the denotations of count nouns are built from non-overlapping generators, while the denotations of mass nouns are built from overlapping generators. Counting is counting of generators, and it will follow that counting is only correct on count denotations.
I will discuss grinding interpretations of count nouns, here rebaptized fission interpretations, and argue that these interpretations differ in crucial ways from the interpretations of lexical mass nouns. The paper will end with a foundational problem raised by fission interpretations, and in the course of this, atomless interpretation domains will re-enter the scene through the back door.
...OR NOT TO COUNT
Count nouns, like boy, can be counted, mass nouns, like salt, cannot:
(1) a. one boy/ two boys/ three boys,. . . b. #one salt/# two salt/ # three salt,. . .
The standard assumption about count nouns is that the denotation of a count noun like boys is a structure of singularities and pluralities, where the singularities are the semantic building blocks of the structure, and we count pluralities in terms of these semantic building blocks. Why can't we similarly count the denotations of mass nouns like meat and salt? Is it something about the building blocks of mass noun denotations, and if so, what?
In this section I discuss some answers to this question.
is not semantically interpreted because it shouldn't be: mass nouns and count nouns have in essence the same denotations. The arbitrariness of the choice between mass nouns and count nouns is illustrated by the fact, for instance, that spaghetti is mass and noodle is count, by the existence of minimal pairs like shoes/footware, and by the free shiftability of nouns between mass and count uses.
While the facts about arbitrariness need to be acknowledged, it is also well-known that the arbitrariness is not absolute: languages that have the mass-count distinction tend to agree on what nouns are prototypically mass and what are prototypically count, and one can ask the same question for these classes: why don't we count prototypical mass nouns, and do we count prototypical count nouns?
Pelletier's shiftability argument aims to show that we are better off assuming that mass nouns and count nouns have the same denotation, except for a bit of contextual restriction. According to Pelletier, nouns shift freely between mass and count uses: mass nouns are packaged as count nouns, as in (2a), while count nouns are ground into mass nouns, as in (2b):
(2) a. We'd like three waters, please. b. After the failed repair attempt, there was watch all over the table.
Pelletier assumes that the easiest account of these facts is the assumption that there is no semantic difference between the mass noun and the count noun: when the feature [+C] is assigned, as in (2a), you can count objects in the denotation of water, and they will be counted like objects are counted (this one, and this one, and this one), while in (2b) counting is lexically disabled, even though what there is on the table is conceptually countable. I will argue later in this paper, following Rothstein (2009a) , that, while grinding is indeed an operation available in the grammar, an operation that maps count noun interpretations onto mass interpretations, the output interpretations of grinding differ semantically in crucial ways from normal mass interpretations. I will argue that the ground interpretation of a count noun cannot be regarded as simply the same interpretation with the count feature removed and maybe some contextual restriction: grinding is a real semantic operation that www.thebalticyearbook.org Mass Nouns 4 maps the input (count) meaning onto a different (mass) meaning.
I will argue here that the same is true for packaging. I have argued myself in Landman (1991) that packaging on noun phrases is a contextually available operation. Look at (3):
Lord Peter, we have examined both the coffee in the cup and the coffee in the pot, and neither have strychnine in them.
Both and neither require a sum of two things. Since coffee is a mass noun, the coffee in the cup and the coffee in the pot sum up in the mass domain to the mass sum of coffee, which is not a sum of two things, because it is mass. We get the correct reading of (3) by packaging the coffee in the cup and packaging the coffee in the pot as two count atoms, and letting the conjunctive noun phrase denote the sum of the two packages. In this contextual shift, there are no constraints on packaging: you just treat the contextually relevant mass entities as packages. Now look at (2a). Suppose the waiter of Chez Jef comes back with a tray on which stand: a scotch glass of carbonated water, a 2 liter bottle of distilled water, and a test tube of water from the canal. We wouldn't find this an appropriate reaction to our request in (2a).
Why not? On the minimal account, we have added the [+C] feature and made objects in the denotation of water available to be selected as count packages. If I say excuse me, we asked for three waters, the waiter can answer: well, that's what you got.
The inappropriateness of the waiter's reaction is naturally accounted for, if we assume that packaging of nouns is a grammatical construction in which an implicit classifier is added:
[ N OU N water] ⇒ [ N OU N [+C] [ C LASS I F I ER e] [ N OU N water]]
On this view, the null classifier has a contextually provided classifier meaning. Thus, a natural interpretation in context would be that [ C LASS I F I ER e] is interpreted as glasses of, or (in Israel) half liter bottles of. Since there is no relevant contextual classifier meaning that comprises the three things that the waiter brings, his reaction is inappropriate.
On this view, packaging of nouns is a real semantic operation that maps the input meaning of the mass noun onto a different output mean-ing of the count noun.
I claim, then, that linguistic evidence suggests that grinding and packaging are not inverse operations that switch freely and without much more semantics than a bit of contextual restriction between count and mass uses of nouns. The fact that these operations have a real semantics suggests, if anything, that the meanings of the count nouns and the mass nouns are semantically different. So the question remains: why can't we count mass?
1.2. We could count mass nouns if we wanted to, but we choose not to.
We are now concerned with theories that do distinguish the meanings of mass nouns and count nouns semantically. We said that pluralities are counted in terms of their semantic building blocks. Following Link (1983) , we can define what counts as semantic building blocks in terms of the notion of a plurality structure: we choose a particular part-of relation, plural-part-of, in terms of which we define counting. Link (1983) creates a sortal distinction between count nouns and mass nouns: count nouns have a denotation in a plurality structure on which a counting operation is defined, mass nouns have a denotation in a structure which is disjoint from the count structure, a mass structure on which a counting operation is not defined. Krifka (1989) does not make this sortal distinction, but defines different partial orders on the same domain. The interpretation domain is ordered by a partial order. For nouns that are [+C] , the noun intension X and natural unit function NU determine in world w a set: A X ,w = λx.NU X ,w (x)=1, the set of objects that naturally function as units that count as 1 X in w.
A second partial order of plural part of is defined on a superset of A X ,w in which the elements of A X ,w are the building blocks (the minimal elements). As Krifka argues in a footnote, crucially his plural-part of order cannot be simply lifted from the general order on the domain, because the elements in A X ,w may overlap in terms of that order.
The analysis in Rothstein (2010) is similar both to Link's and to Krifka's. With Link, she assumes a typal distinction between the denotations of mass nouns and count nouns. With Krifka, she derives the count noun denotations from a counting function which assigns the value 1. Her analysis differs from Krifka's in that she assumes that the www.thebalticyearbook.org Mass Nouns 6 minimal elements need not be conceptually natural objects, but can be contextually selected, and conceptually rather arbitrary.
These theories distinguish mass denotations from count denotations and assume that the latter, but not the former, are interpreted relative to part-of structures for which counting is defined. If we don't go any further, we get what I would call a we-choose-not-to answer to the question of why we can't count mass nouns: we have two types of structures, one that comes equipped with a counting operation and one that does not, and mass nouns are interpreted in the structure that is not equipped with the counting operation. In other words, count nouns have the possibility of counting built into their meaning, while mass nouns do not.
In that case, the answer to why we can't count mass nouns is simple: because we decided not to build the possibility of counting into their meaning. Thus, we interpret the feature [±C] semantically, but rather minimally: we don't count mass nouns, because we have equipped count nouns but not mass nouns with a counter: we can choose between equipped and non-equipped interpretations of nouns, and that's all there is to it (an answer along this line is suggested in Sybesma (2009) ).
Interestingly enough, neither Link, nor Krifka, nor Rothstein seem to regard this as a sufficiently insightful analysis. While separating mass noun and count noun denotations typally, Link (1983) (and Landman 1991) make further assumptions about mass structures which makes it structurally impossible to equip the mass domain with a counting operation (see below). Krifka (1989) assumes that the objects that count as one in a noun denotation are selected to count as one by a natural unit function, and suggests that mass nouns cannot be counted for conceptual reasons: mass nouns do not come conceptually with natural units of counting, while count nouns do. Rothstein (2010) argues against this: many count nouns are contextually count and their semantic units are not necessarily 'natural units' at all. She assumes that the count domain selects in context the objects of count 1 to be objects that are in that context mutually disjoint. (following an earlier incarnation of the present paper).
The present paper is not about count nouns: I am sympathetic to all three approaches to count nouns. However, as far as mass nouns are concerned, I share the discomfort: I find the we-choose-no-to-account uninsightful and practically circular, and I think we can do a bit better.
1.3. We can't count mass nouns because they have no semantic building blocks or instable semantic building blocks.
The semantic building blocks of a count noun denotation are generally assumed to be the minimal elements in that denotation. Hence counting is counting of minimal elements. A very common assumption in the earlier literature is that mass noun denotations differ from count noun denotation in that mass noun denotations are not built from minimal elements, or don't have minimal elements at all (see e.g. ter Meulen 1980 , Bunt 1985 , Link 1983 , Landman 1991 . A representative example is given by the following (almost) quote:
"What are the minimal parts of water? Chemistry tells us that they are the water molecules. But water molecules can be counted, while water cannot be counted. This shows that natural language semantics does not incorporate the insights of chemistry in its models: in our semantic domains, the water molecules are not the minimal parts of water. In fact, the real semantic question is: is there any evidence, semantic evidence, to assume that mass entities like water are built from minimal parts at all, either from minimal parts that are water, or from minimal parts that aren't water? If there is no such semantic evidence, it is theoretically better to assume that the semantic system does not impose a requirement of minimal parts. Since there is no semantic evidence for minimal parts, we should assume nonatomic structures for the mass domain. That has the added bonus that we can nicely explain why we cannot count mass entities, because counting is counting of atoms." (paraphrase of Landman 1991, pp 312-313) Chierchia 1998 challenges this view by pointing at mass nouns like furniture (and others discussed in Pelletier & Schubert 1989 /2002 (5) There is salt on the viewing plate of the microscope, one molecule's worth.
[-C]
The observation is that the mass noun salt in (5) is felicitous, though intuitively, what is on the viewing plate doesn't have any parts that are themselves salt. If we assume that semantically the denotation of salt is divisible, and salt has no minimal elements, then we are forced to invent here an infinite structure of non-existent salt parts that are themselves in the denotation of salt. I call this homeopathic semantics: to postulate arcane semantic structures solely to avoid counting: we "dilute" the salt so far that not a single molecule remains, yet semantically we continue to divide it into parts that semantically count as salt.
But such an approach is implausible. The real observation is that divisibility is plausible at a macro level, because at a macro level we can unproblematically divide, say, water into two parts that both have the right characteristics to count as water. But at a micro level, this is no longer plausible, and at some level you reach a point where what you have doesn't divide anymore into two parts that can both count as water.
So what is in the microscope is salt, but cannot be split into parts that are themselves salt, hence, what is in the microscope is a pretty good candidate for a minimal salt part.
The micro level doesn't have to be this small. Look at the follow-ing picture: It's a piece of wallpaper, of the kind that I would call in Dutch driehoekjesbehang, triangle-patterned wallpaper, wallpaper with little triangles. Now, there is a sense in which any part of a piece of trianglepatterned wallpaper can be called triangle-patterned wallpaper, even if it doesn't have the pattern on it (i.e. a piece that was cut out of a role of triangle-patterned wallpaper). But there is another sense, and that is the one I am interested in here, in which in order for a piece of wallpaper to count as triangle-patterned wallpaper, it must contain the pattern, i.e. a triangle. In this sense, if I cut a circle out of the triangle patterned wallpaper above as in A, I wouldn't call the piece I have cut out driehoekjesbehang, but if I cut it as in B, I would: On www.thebalticyearbook.org Mass Nouns 10 this interpretation, the circular piece in B can no longer be cut into two parts, each of which counts itself as driehoekjesbehang. And this piece can be part of a partition of the piece of wallpaper into parts that all count as driehoekjesbehang, but cannot themselves be split into two parts that both count as driehoekjesbehang. And these parts are good candidates for (contextually provided) minimal parts. Note that the division into two parts that both count as driehoekjesbehang is important here, because we are concerned with count. If we take one piece of driehoekjesbehang we can often divide that into two pieces, one of which continues to count as driehoekjesbehang, while the other does not. I call this shaving: the piece that still counts as diehoekjesbehang after you have cut off a snippet counts as the same piece of driehoekjesbehang, just as a clean-shaven version of me counts as the same person. This means that I assume that the division into minimal parts is a division up to intensional identity (the relation that makes the shaved version and the unshaved version of me count as one). I will refrain from developing this part of the theory, but I do assume that an appropriate intensional identity relation has to be added.
Examples like this can be multiplied for mass nouns denoting patterned materials. They show that the idea that elements in the denotation of a mass noun can always be split into parts that are also in the denotation of the mass noun is unwarranted.
In many respects the theory developed in Chierchia (2010) moves back from the proposals in Chierchia (1998) towards the homeopathic theory. Chierchia (2010) assumes that you cannot count mass nouns because the minimal elements in the denotation of the mass noun can be, what he calls, instable, where an element in a denotation N is instable if it is vague whether the element should count as one or as two.
Obviously if you don't know of your minimal elements whether they count as one or as two or as many, you can't count them.
Since Chierchia (1998) argues that this situation is not what goes on in the denotation of nouns like furniture, in the recent paper, Chierchia pooh-poohs the importance of mass nouns like furniture, moving to a position that, after all, these aren't really 'real' mass nouns.
I find this move disappointing, and will argue later in this paper that furniture nouns really are 'real' mass nouns (though 'neat' ones). Neither am I charmed by the analysis in terms of instable minimal elements, because I think that, on closer view, this is just a variant of the homeopathic theory: while the theory doesn't assume that you can continue to divide elements in a mass noun denotation infinitely, i.e. smaller and smaller, it seems to assume that you can divide them indefinitely, smaller and smaller, approaching but never surely reaching the 'true' non-vague minimal elements.
The problem is that this theory is also homeopathic. The cases of salt in the microscope and triangle-patterned wallpaper are as problematic for Chierchia's later theory as they are for the 'no minimal elements' theory: what there is in the microscope is not an instable element in Chierchia's sense. In fact, put two molecules in the microscope: in that case you can partition the salt into two parts, neither of which can be partitioned into salt. Also in this case, there is salt in the microscope, but not instable salt in Chierchia's sense: the two-molecule structure can only be bi-partitioned into parts that count as salt that cannot themselves be bi-partitioned into salt. The instability that Chierchia requires for mass noun denotations ('don't know whether it's one or two') is absent.
The same is true in the case of driehoekjesbehang: none of the parts in the partition indicated for the triangle-patterned wallpaper are instable in Chierchia's sense, because they can only count as one. Yet, we cannot count triangle-patterned wallpaper.
I think that the homeopathic account, whether in the classical form or in the form of Chierchia (2010) , is untenable.
We can't count mass nouns because they have vague building blocks.
This is suggested by Chierchia (1998) . Chierchia (2010) can be regarded as his way of making this suggestion precise in such a way that www.thebalticyearbook.org Mass Nouns 12 the vagueness involved distinguishes mass nouns from count nouns: mass nouns have instable minimal elements, while count nouns have stable minimal elements. I am not denying that Chierchia's notion of instability may be a useful notion. I do not think though that it can be used to distinguish mass nouns from count nouns, and I do not think that it can be used to explain why mass nouns cannot be counted.
As Chierchia (2010) realizes very well, other notions of vagueness discussed in the vagueness literature are patently not notions that tell mass nouns apart from count nouns, and hence cannot be used to distinguish the two.
-Cardinal vagueness
Look at the examples in (6): (6) a. How many quarks are there in the water in the sea?
[+C] b. #There is more than two water in the sea.
[
-C]
We don't know how many quarks there are in the water, and the number may even be truly undetermined (because of quantum mechanics). But that doesn't prevent quark from being count, and (6a) from being felicitous. We don't know how many minimal parts of water there are in the sea, but arguably, whatever the number, it's more than two: if we divide the water naturally into two parts that are water, normally these will divide themselves into parts that are water. So the statement in (2b) should be true in a natural context; but, of course, that doesn't make it felicitous.
-Borderline vagueness Maybe we can assume that the denotation of mass nouns like salt is generated from building blocks that are not salt, nor non-salt, but borderline salt. -Higher-order vagueness On accounts of higher order vagueness, it is not the set of atoms which is vague, but the whole part-of structure itself. Such an account needs to be formalized, of course. Chierchia's (2010) account can be understood as an analysis in this spirit, and so can the analysis that I will present here (though I don't think of it in terms of vagueness myself).
So I have nothing as such against the idea that we cannot count mass noun denotations because they involve higher order vagueness, and count nouns do not, since it may well be possible to reformulate my account in those terms.
1.5. We cannot count mass noun denotations because we cannot pull the semantic building blocks out of the mass noun denotation.
In the analysis of Chierchia (1998) , count nouns have access to the set of building blocks, while mass nouns do not. The account can be illustrated with the Dutch triple in (7):
(7) meubel meubels meubilair piece of furniture pieces of furniture furniture singular count plural count mass
For the count noun, Chierchia follows Hoeksema's (1983) account, in which the singular noun denotes a set of atoms, the plural noun denotes the closure of that set under sum minus the set of atoms. The mass noun, for Chierchia, denotes the union of the two, i.e. just the closure of the singular noun under sum: * P = {y: ∃X ⊆ P: y = ⊔X}
This semantic choice was always unfortunate, in the light of the well known problems that Hoeksema's analysis of plurals faces (as discussed in Lasersohn (1988) , Rothstein (1992) , summarized in Landman (2000)).
But the main idea of Chierchia's analysis can be maintained without having to rely on Hoeksema's account. The essence of the analysis www.thebalticyearbook.org Mass Nouns 14 is that the interpretations of the singular and plural count noun are derived from a lexically provided set of atoms in terms of which we count, and the interpretation of the mass noun is not. The access to this set of atoms is preserved in the count noun interpretations, and the interpretations of numericals refer to it. We can easily deal with this, if we make our semantic representations a bit richer. Let the noun meaning be a pair, of which the first element is the standard interpretation, and the second element the Chierchia set, which is lexically provided, and semantically accessed by the interpretations of the numericals. Thus:
with MEUBEL a set of atoms meubels −→ < * MEUBEL, MEUBEL> meubilair−→ < * MEUBEL, -> On this account, the plural and the mass noun have the same interpretation, but only the first allows access to the set of atoms MEUBEL, the second element of the pair. As we will see below, my own proposal for the semantics of nouns like furniture is very close to this, except that in the theory to be developed, the second element of the pair plays a different and more fundamental role. On Chierchia's theory, the difference between the plural meubels and the mass noun meubilair lies only in the lexical access to the set of atoms, there is no difference in structure. Since the theory is a general theory of mass nouns, mass nouns like salt and mud are assumed to have the same kinds of denotations: (10) salt −→< * MIN-SALT, -> where MIN-SALT is a set of atoms Chierchia assumes that the set MIN-SALT is vague, unlike the set of minimal elements of count nouns. As we have seen, it isn't clear what notion of vagueness would be at stake here (note that Chierchia's later theory is not a modification of the theory under discussion here, but a rejection of it.) As I see it, the main problem with the theory of Chierchia (1998) is that the mass and the count denotations are so close that one seriously wonders why languages have the mass-count distinction at all.
We encode lexical access to the set of atoms only in count nouns, and hence mass nouns cannot be counted. But why don't they shift in context, when the set of atoms is made salient: The language easily allows me to package water into macro packages, but not into minimal water parts: (11) a. I would like two coffees, two cognacs and two waters, please. b. #There are far more than a billion waters in this cup of water.
It seems that, if there isn't any deeper reason why we cannot count mass nouns than Chierchia gives, the packaging in (11b) ought to be the most obvious one available. But it isn't. And is it just an imperfection of mass nouns that the set of atoms is not available? Why do languages bother distinguishing mass nouns and count nouns? A set of atoms is sitting at the bottom of the mass noun denotation and at the bottom of the count noun denotation. The theory postulates that it can be pulled out in the second case, but not in the first case, and this is why you can't count. The problem is that it is not particularly difficult to semantically or contextually pull a set of atoms out of an atomic structure. . . . a child can do it. And there, of course, is the problem: the child doesn't do it.
VARIANTS

Counting and non-overlap.
All theories of count nouns that define counting in terms of a partial order take care to distinguish the order relative to which counting takes place from the partial order these things stand in in the mass domain. In all these theories, there is a counting function that will count a plurality in count denotation X in terms of its parts in X that count as one.
For prototypical count nouns, these parts that count as one will not overlap in the mass sense either, they will have no part in common: i.e. prototypically the denotations of boy, soccer ball and planet are sets of the elements that are mutually disjoint. But mass overlap is, of course, not impossible: my two hands and my ten fingers are objects in the www.thebalticyearbook.org Mass Nouns 16 count domain, and there are predicates like body part that may include them all. But the way counting works is that, if we can count entities simultaneously as one, the partial order in terms of which the counting is done, starts from the elements that count as one, and ignores their potential mass overlap, i.e. the count domain treats these entities as if they do not overlap.
As we said, prototypically count nouns have minimal elements that do not overlap in the first place. As Rothstein (2010) argues, nouns that include overlapping entities normally restrict their denotation to eliminate the overlap. Thus, we may count a fence structure put up by four farmers as one fence, or as four fences, but not normally as five.
There are situations where the overlap is not eliminated. Recently, I ordered a set of Krifka-Rothstein Outfits For All Occasions (cf. Krifka (2009)): 1. The pants and the shirt (for informal meetings) 2. The pants and the shirt and the tie (for informal meetings with Europeans) 3. The pants and the shift and the jacket (for formal meetings) 4. The pants and the shirt and the tie and the jacket (for formal meetings with Europeans) 5. The pants and the shirt and the tie and the jacket and the vest (in case I get invited to dine at High Table) And, I have a fitting kipah, yarmulka, in case any of these occasions involves a religious ceremony, which makes all together 10 outfits (in fact, there are more combinations, but I don't have occasions for them).
As Krifka (2009) argues, these outfits are intensional entities, in that they do not all simultaneously exist in one and the same situation. And in fact, this is shown in the following counting situation: (13) There will be no religious ceremonies this trip, so only five outfits are relevant.
For the arithmetic to come out correctly here, we must count each outfit as one, and ignore the mass overlap. We do this either by packagingtreating each sum of clothing as an atomic individual in its own right (following Link 1984)-or by defining a new count part-of relation on the sums of clothing, which too treats the mass overlap as irrelevant (following Krifka 1989 ). And we must do this, because, as Krifka 1989 stresses, counting is an additive measure in that 1+1=2 only holds for 1's that do not overlap, and in the count domain 1+1 is indeed 2. So, we all agree, then, that count means non-overlap, or overlap made irrelevant. If so, maybe the problem with counting in the mass domain is overlap, or overlap not made irrelevant. This is the underlying idea of the present analysis.
Variants
All the proposals discussed so far can be seen as being formulated one way or other in terms of underspecification: -Mass is mass because it isn't specified as count. -Mass is mass because it isn't equipped with a counting function -Mass is mass because looking down in a mass denotation, you don't see any building blocks. -Mass is mass because looking down in a mass denotation, you don't see the building blocks clearly. -Mass is mass because you see the building blocks all right, but cannot pull them out. My proposal is formulated in terms of overspecification: I propose that when you look down in a mass denotation you see too many building blocks. And hence, when you count building blocks in a mass denotation, you will count them wrong. We will take our inspiration from the following example. The picture shows a body of water, and sentence (14), with mass noun salt, is felicitous and true: (14) There is salt [-C] in the water, two molecules worth. On the perspective on which we count, we have two variants of salt each with two non-overlapping building blocks (in the example, the molecules): SALT 1 +SALT 2 versus SALT 3 +SALT 4 . For counting we choose one of these variants, and we count relative to it. I am proposing here that for mass noun denotations we do not make the choice between these variants: as far as the mass denotation of salt is concerned, it is equally appropriate to regard the salt as being built from SALT 1 +SALT 2 as it is to regard it as being built from SALT 3 +SALT 4 , and in fact, we don't make the choice and regard the salt as built, simultaneously if you want, from both variants. Thus, the mass perspective merges all variants into one part-of structure, so to say scrambles them and gives (in the example) four overlapping building blocks.
We assume that counting is counting of semantic building blocks. If you insist on counting the building blocks in the denotation of the mass noun salt, you will count overlapping building blocks (four, in the example), and you are guaranteed to count wrong! This is the proposal of the present paper:
The denotations of mass nouns cannot be counted, because counting goes wrong! On this proposal, the reason you cannot count prototypical mass noun denotations is not 'vertical': it's not that when you look down you see nothing, or nothing very well. The reason is 'horizontal': when you look around you at the other building blocks, you see a multitude of overlapping building blocks coming from different variants.
In general, we get variants by dividing objects into parts in different ways, without making a choice between these different ways of division. We took the case of salt dissolved in water as our model. But many other cases come to mind. The unit structure of a crystal like diamond forms a lattice structure. But the structure is part of a larger lattice structure and there is more than one way of partitioning the crystal into its crystal units: Division A is not more 'real' than division B: What about, say, gold, which in its metal state is neatly built up from gold atoms? Where are the variants? If you insist, I will maintain that each gold atom in your ring is built from 79 nucleons and 79 electrons, but for each gold atom, one of its electrons wanders freely through your ring. Now, with which electron does each gold atom form a gold atom? Chemistry, I think, doesn't care, since chemistry doesn't really count gold-atoms, it measures how much gold there is.
I will not go down further on the path of speculating how we get variants given various chemical substances. I take the model as an inspiration for the semantics of mass nouns, rather than as a straitjacket to fit chemistry into. A better picture of the semantics of prototypical mass nouns is the following.
www.thebalticyearbook.org Mass Nouns 20 Take a big juicy slab of meat. With Chierchia (1998) , I think that we can think of this as being built from minimal parts. Not natural meatparts, but minimal parts that are appropriately minimal in a context. For instance, they are the pieces as small as a skilled butcher, or our special finegrained meat-cutting machine can cut them. Suppose the meat cutting machine consists of two sharp knife-lattices that cut the meat from left to right, and then from front to back, snap-snap. This will cut the meat into very many minimal meat pieces.
But if I move the knife-lattices slightly, the front-back knife to the left, the left-right knife to the front, and cut snap-snap, I get a different partition into minimal meat pieces. And of course, there are many ways of moving the knives. All these partitions cut into pieces which, in context, can count as minimal meat pieces. None of these partitions has a privileged status, and none of these partitions provides its minimal pieces with the privileged status of being the 'real' minimal pieces. On my view, all of these pieces count equally as minimal meat pieces in the context given, and the meat is built from all of them.
Similarly for the case of driehoekjesbehang discussed above. We gave one partition into minimal pieces of driehoekjesbehang above, but, of course, there are many other such partitions. Since it is a partition, each partition will consist of one square and some space. Since there is enough space that needs to be divided up, many partitions exist, and hence driehoekjesbehang is built from minimal pieces of driehoekjesbe-hang, many of which overlap.
In fact, I think this case is instructive as a model even for mass nouns like water. When we think of partitioning a body of water, up to water molecules, we may be inclined to regard the structure as consisting of non-spatio-temporally realized Mickey Mouse molecules: And the two minimal elements are two molecules. But the space between the molecules is part of the body of water and shouldn't be ignored. Which means that here too we can argue that a minimal element in the denotation of the mass noun water will be something that consists of some essential structure (a Mickey Mouse) and some space. And again, there are many ways of dividing the space, and hence, many ways of partitioning the water into minimal mass-parts.
In sum: I propose that mass noun denotations are built from overlapping building blocks coming from a multiplicity of simultaneous variants, different ways of dividing the stuff into minimal parts. Count noun denotations, on the other hand, are built from building blocks that are, or are made, non-overlapping, denotations that form a single variant.
REGULAR SETS
We want to build a theory of mass and count noun denotations that generalizes the standard Boolean semantics for count nouns to include mass nouns, based on the idea that mass noun denotations are built from simultaneous variants. In this, we want to stay as close to the Boolean semantics as we can.
We start by spelling out a list of standard notions.
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We assume that the domain in which mass nouns and count nouns are interpreted forms a complete atomic Boolean algebra BOOL = <BOOL, ⊑, ¬, ⊔, ⊓, 0,1>.
Let X ⊆ BOOL.
* X = {b ∈ BOOL: ∃Y ⊆ X:b = ⊔Y} Let x,y ∈ BOOL-{0} x and y are disjoint iff x ⊓ y=0 x and y overlap iff x ⊓ y =0
Let X ⊆ BOOL-{0} X is disjoint iff ∀x,y ∈ X: x and y are disjoint X overlaps iff X is not disjoint.
Two (non-zero) elements overlap if they have a non-zero part in common (x ⊓ y), otherwise they are disjoint. A set is disjoint if any two elements in it are disjoint.
X is maximally disjoint in Y iff X is disjoint and X ⊆ Y and for every Z ⊆ Y: if Z is disjoint and Z ⊇ X then X=Z X is maximally disjoint in Y if X is a disjoint subset of Y and adding any more elements of Y to X makes X overlap.
x is a minimal element of X iff x ∈ X-{0) and for every y ∈ X-{0}: if y ⊑ x then y = x min(X) is the set of minimal elements of X.
A generating set for X is a set gen(X) ⊆ X-{0} such that: ∀x ∈ X: ∃Y ⊆ gen(X):
Generating here means generating under complete sum. If gen(X) is a generating set of X, then every element of X is generated as the (complete) sum of elements in gen(X).
The following facts are important for our purposes: -If 0 ∈ X, 0 is generated by any set gen(X), since generation is under complete sum, ∅ is a subset of every set, and ⊔∅ = 0.
-If gen(X) is a generating set of X, then min(X) ⊆ gen(X). This is because generation is under sum, and gen(X) ⊆ X. Minimal elements in X can only be generated under ⊔ from gen(X) by being already in gen(X).
-But sets can have more than one set of generators. If X is itself a Boolean algebra, min(X) is a generating set for X, and hence so is any set Y such that min(X) ⊆ Y ⊆ X, including X itself.
So far all notions introduced are completely standard. We now use these to introduce the notions we are after.
A generated set is a pair X = <X,gen(X)>, with gen(X) a generating set for X.
In the theory to be developed, the denotations of lexical nouns are going to be generated sets.
Standard notions are lifted to generated sets in the obvious way, For instance:
Let X = <X,gen(X)>be a generated set X is bounded iff X is bounded X is bounded iff 0, ⊔X ∈ X We now define the notion of a variant.
Let X = <X,gen(X)>be a bounded generated set.
V is a variant for X iff 1. V is a maximally disjoint subset of gen(X) 2. * V is a subset of X such that ⊔X ∈ * V A variant for X is a maximally disjoint subset of gen(X) whose closure generates elements of X, including the top element ⊔X.
The closure * V of variant V for X is a Boolean algebra with ⊔X as maximal element and V as the atoms. This means then that for each variant V for X, ⊔X is generated as ⊔V.
X is generated by variants iff 1. For every x ∈ X there is some variant V for X such that x ∈ * V 2. Every disjoint subset of gen(X) is part of some variant for X.
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X is closed under variants iff for every b ∈ X: ps X (b) is generated by variants.
So, if X is closed under variants it is not just X (= ps X (⊔X)) that is generated by variants, but the generated X-part set of every element in X is as well.
Next we introduce the notion of Boolean relative complement:
Let x,z ∈ BOOL and x ⊑ z ¬ z x = ⊔{y ∈ (z]: x ⊓ y = 0} The relative complement of x in z is the sum of all the Boolean parts of z that do not overlap x. Let X ⊆ BOOL X is relatively complemented iff for every x and z in X:
This means that for every b ∈ X, ps X (b) is closed under relative complement. With these notions we define the notion of a regular set:
Let X be a bounded generated set.
X is regular iff X is closed under variants and X is relatively complemented.
We impose the following interpretation constraint on lexical nouns:
Constraint on lexical nouns:
Mass nouns and count nouns denote regular sets.
(More precisely, plural count nouns denote regular sets. Singular count nouns denote sets <V,V> such that < * V,V> is a regular set.) Fact 1: If B is a complete atomic Boolean algebra with set of atoms ATOM B , then B = <B,ATOM B > is a regular set.
Fact 2: Let S = NA ∪ CL be a disjoint subset of BOOL. Let SALT = {b ∈ S: |min * S (b) ∪ NA| = |min * S (b) ∪ CL|} (SALT is the set of those sums of NA and CL elements, that are built from as many NA-elements as CL-elements.) Then SALT = <SALT,min(SALT)> is a regular set.
Regular sets are meant to be generalizations of Boolean algebras that stay as close to Boolean algebras as is possible.
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The idea is that the denotation of a count noun is generated from a single variant, a set of non-overlapping elements. The mass noun denotation is a simultaneous multiplicity of such variants, each a Boolean algebra which represents a different way of partitioning the same stuff (i.e. with the same supremum). These Boolean algebras are scrambled together into a regular set, collecting the variants together in one set of generators. This means that the set of generators is going to contain mutually overlapping elements, since the variants represent different partitions of the same stuff.
The guiding intuition about the set of generators, gen(X), of regular set X is that it is the set of semantic building blocks. And these are the things that we would want to count as one.
THE BOOLEAN INTUITIONS
Regular sets generalize Boolean algebras. Regular sets are not always Boolean algebras. The question is: if we move away from Boolean algebras, aren't we giving up on Boolean properties that motivated the Boolean approach to the semantics of count nouns in the first place? I will make a few remarks here.
Cumulativity.
If noun denotations are Boolean algebras, then they are cumulative, closed under sum. The validity of cumulativity for mass nouns and plural nouns has been a motivating principle for the Boolean approach:
-If x and y are salt. then x ⊔ y is salt.
-If x and y are horses, then x ⊔y are horses.
By moving to regular sets, it may seem that we are giving up on cumulativity, since cumulativity is not valid for regular sets in general, because, unlike Boolean algebras, regular sets are not necessarily closed under sum. Counterexamples can be found in the set SALT defined above:
Let Na ∈ NA and Cl 1 , Cl 2 ∈ CL.
Then Na ⊔ Cl 1 ∈ SALT and Na ⊔ Cl 2 ∈ SALT (since the amount of Na and Cl is the same).
However, (Na ⊔ Cl 1 ) ⊔ (Na ⊔ Cl 2 ) = Na ⊔ Cl 1 ⊔ Cl 2 / ∈ SALT, since the amount of Na and Cl is not the same.
The observation is: cumulativity is not valid for salt with overlapping building blocks. To which I add: and it shouldn't be! Regular sets do satisfy the form of cumulativity that is intuitively valid (cf. Krifka 1989):
-If x and y are salt and x and y are disjoint then x⊔y is salt.
Namely: if x, y ∈ SALT, and x ⊓ y = 0, then x is generated by a disjoint subset V x of gen(SALT) and y is generated by a disjoint subset Vy of gen(SALT), and since x and y are disjoint, V x ∪ V y is disjoint. Since SALT is a regular set, V x ∪ V y is part of a variant for SALT, and hence ⊔(V x ∪ V y ) ∈ SALT, which is x ⊔ y. What about complex noun phrases? Lønning (1987) assumes that both nouns and adjectives denote Boolean part-of sets. Since (x] ∩ (y] = (x ⊓ y], intersecting a noun with an adjective automatically gives you a set which is itself a Boolean part set.
I am actually not following Lønning here even for count nouns: I assume that a count noun is generated by a disjoint set, but I am not requiring this set to be a set of atoms in BOOL (in this respect I am following Krifka (1989) , rather than Link (1983) or Landman (1989) ).
But what about intersective adjectives? Shouldn't they be Boolean? The answer is that we need to look at the semantics in each particular case, and if we do so, we can, I claim, get the right semantics with regular sets.
For instance, look at the locative modifier in the shaker and the noun phrase salt in the shaker. I think, with Lønning, that this noun www.thebalticyearbook.org Mass Nouns 28 phrase ought to denote a regular set. But note that the semantics of locatives will tell us that if something is in the shaker, its parts are in the shaker. And this means that it is not difficult to make sure compositionally that salt in the shaker denotes ps SALT (b) for some b ∈ SALT: the salt-parts that are in the shaker (i.e. salt-parts that are part of the sum of salt-parts that are in the shaker). Since SALT is a regular set, ps SALT (b) is also a regular set, so the Lønning intuition is satisfied in this case.
But we don't want the semantics to work like this in all cases. In the count domain, numericals like at least three intersect with the noun interpretation, but their interpretation is not Boolean, and the intersection is not either, and shouldn't be. Now think about adjectives in the mass domain, like yellow. If we assume that yellow is a property that mass entities only acquire in some bulk, then yellow is like at least three in the count domain, and we shouldn't expect the noun phrase to denote itself a regular set.
Let us assume that the salt is yellow: ⊔(SALT) ∈ SALT ∩ YELLOW. Let us assume that yellow comes in bulk and that the single salt molecule (NaCl) is not yellow: (NaCL) ∈ SALT -YELLOW. We have a lot of salt, though, and the color comes in bulk, so intuitively taking that one molecule away leaves us with yellow salt:
But this means that the denotation of yellow salt (on the bulkinterpretation) is not a regular set, since it is not closed under relative complement. And, I think, this is the way it should be: the case is completely parallel to that of at least three boys in the count domain, the denotation of which is also not closed under relative complement.
The problem, then, is with Lønning's identification of intersective adjectives with Boolean adjectives, not with the generalization from Boolean denotations to regular sets. We can do the semantics on regular sets just as well as we did on Boolean sets (and, in some cases, we can do better).
COUNTING GENERATORS
A regular noun intension maps every world onto a regular set. Lexical mass nouns and (plural) count nouns have regular intensions. For noun intension N and world w, we write N w for the regular set which is the extension of N at w, where N w = <N w , gen(Nw)>.
We define a function COUNT which maps every regular noun intension N and world w onto a relation between the elements of N w and natural numbers in : formulae Count specifies different ways of counting the elements of N w , for noun intension N: -The generators of N w count as 1. -The count of b ∈ N w is the arithmetic sum of the count of its generating parts in N w . -The count of b ∈ N w is also the arithmetic sum of the count of its generating parts per generating variant.
To this we add a correctness criterion for counting:
Correctness criterion: COUNT is correct on a regular noun intension N iff for every world w: N w is a function from N w into The idea is:
Count nouns have intensions on which COUNT is correct. Mass nouns have intensions on which COUNT is incorrect.
The intensional definition takes care of borderline cases of mass denotations with 1 or 0 elements. It is obviously hard to distinguish an empty mass denotation from an empty count denotation, and one may ask why (15a) is felicitous, but (15b) On the analysis given, COUNT is incorrect for salt despite null and singleton denotations: to be correct for a regular intension, COUNT must be correct for the regular denotation of salt in each world, which, of course, it isn't (Krifka (1989) also defines count for noun intensions, albeit for different reasons).
We look at two prototypical examples.
We assume that the count noun boys has an intension BOY which at each world determines a regular set BOY w = < * BOYw,BOYw>, where BOYw is a disjoint subse5t of BOOL.
In the example the set of generators is: {sam, ben, max, bernard}.
For every world w, gen(BOY w ) forms a single variant for BOY w . Hence we do not need to check condition 4 of COUNT independently.
This means that for every world w, COUNT is indeed a function on BOY w , and COUNT is correct on BOY.
The mass noun salt is mapped onto an intension SALT which maps each world w onto a regular set SALT w = <SALT w ,gen(SALT w )>. We take the above structure as an example.
By the definition we gave above, SALT w is the set of elements that contain equal amounts of Na and Cl:
We assume in this example that the set of generators equals the set of minimal elements:
This set is built from two variants:
Hence the salt is built from building blocks that overlap. Now we count:
Hence, all in all: COUNT SALTw (Na ⊔ N a ⊔ Cl ⊔ Cl ) = 4 and COUNT SALTw (Na ⊔ N a ⊔ Cl ⊔ Cl ) = 2 So, COUNT is not a function on SALTw, and COUNT is incorrect on SALT.
COUNT AND MASS -NEAT AND MESS
We now take up the motivating idea concerning overlap and define count nouns as nouns whose intension at every world specifies a regular set built from a set of non-overlapping generators, while mass nouns are nouns whose intension at every world specifies a regular set built from a set of non-overlapping generators (if the denotations are big enough to allow this):
Let X be a function from worlds to regular sets. While defined for intensions, we will freely use these features for the structures X w themselves, and call these structures count and mass. This definition in principle allows nouns that are neither mass nor count. I don't assume that lexical nouns can be specified that way. While I could have defined [-C] as the complement of [+C], the definition given presents mass and count more strongly as different semantic perspectives: always overlapping generators versus always disjoint generators.
Interestingly enough, the theory of regular sets allows a second kind of mass structure, which is mass, but in several ways closer to count. For this, we introduce the following opposition:
X is [+N], neat, iff for every w: min(X w ) is disjoint i.e. the minimal elements of X w do not overlap X is [-N], mess, iff for every w: if |X w |>1 then min(X w ) is not disjoint, i.e. the minimal elements of X w overlap.
On this definition, neat nouns are nouns whose intension at every world specifies a regular set whose set of minimal elements is nonoverlapping, while mess nouns are nouns whose intension at every world specifies a regular set whose set of minimal elements is overlapping (again, if the denotations are big enough to allow this).
By definition, count entails neat: [-N] ⇒ [-C] Equivalently, mess entails mass: [+C] ⇒ [+N]
The mass structure for salt given in the previous section is a structure that is mess mass [-C, -N] . Its set of generators overlap ([-C]), and since the set of generators is the set of minimal elements, its set of minimal elements overlap ([-N] ). But the theory allows structures that are neat mass: [-C, +N]. These are structures in which the set of generators overlaps, but the set of minimal elements does not.
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In this structure, the set of generators includes more than just the minimal elements. The building blocks are what we intuitively want to count as one. Thus, in this structure singularities and pluralities are counted as one simultaneously, without making sure that they do not overlap.
The difference with count is that for count nouns a plurality of boys does not itself count as one boy. But a plurality of kitchenware, like the cup and saucer, can count itself as kitchenware, and can also count as one. For instance, it counts as one on an inventory listing where everything that is sold as one item has its own price.
Rothstein (2010) discusses count nouns like line, highway, mirror: objects in the denotation of these nouns typically have objects as parts that themselves can be in the denotation of these nouns: a line divides into lines, a highway into highways, a mirror breaks into mirrors.
But before the mirror breaks, we do not, in a normal context, count the mirror and its parts that would count as mirrors when broken as more than one: only the maximal mirror counts. Thus the mirrors that we do count don't overlap, or we make them not overlap by packaging.
Neat mass denotations are different: the teapot, the cup, the saucer, the cup and saucer all count as kitchenware and can all count as one simultaneously in the same context.
Neat mass nouns differ from mess mass nouns like salt and meat, in that the minimal building blocks of neat nouns are non-overlapping: the minimal building blocks of meubilair, furniture, are the meubels, the pieces of furniture. The generating set of furniture overlaps, but the overlap is only vertical: a sum and its parts count as one simultaneously.
In other words: the denotations of neat nouns are sets in which the distinction between singular individuals and plural individuals is not properly articulated.
In context, the denotation of furniture may be equated with its set of generators. Then we would get the following denotations:
We see that this is in fact very close to what I proposed as a reasonable version of the theory of Chierchia 1998, except, of course, that I add here an interpretation to these pairs, that fits them naturally into the theory of mass nouns I am developing here. Hence, the reason why you cannot count neat nouns is not the reason that Chierchia gives. The reason is that counting goes wrong.
In the above example,gen(KITCHENWARE w ) = { the teapot, the cup, the saucer, the pan, the cup and saucer, the teaset } We calculate the count for the teaset:
-COUNT KITCHENWAREw (the teaset) = 1 because the teaset ∈ gen(KITCHENWARE w ) Generators count as 1.
-COUNT KITCHENWAREw (the teaset) = 5 because the teaset = the teaset ⊔ the teapot ⊔ the cup ⊔ the saucer, and the teaset, the teapot, the cup, the saucer ∈ gen(KITCHENWARE w ) The count of the teaset is the arithmetic sum of the count of its generator parts.
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-COUNT KITCHENWAREw (the teaset) = 3 because the teapot ⊔ the cup ⊔ the saucer, and the teapot, the cup, the saucer ∈ gen(KITCHENWARE w ) Here we count relative to the variant: {the teapot, the cup, the saucer}.
Clearly, then, COUNT is incorrect, and kitchenware is mass. It is neat mass, because the minimal elements are neatly disjoint. Rothstein (2010) assumes that the mass nouns furniture and kitchenware are like the count nouns boys and peas in that their sets of minimal elements are individuated or naturally atomic. The following is an attempt at (partially) formalizing this notion.
INDIVIDUATED SETS AND THE TWO FEATURE SYSTEM
Let X be a regular noun intension and D be a set of naturalistic properties, like properties of Form, square, round,..; properties of Size, big, small,..; properties of Weight, heavy, light,..; properties of Color, red, green,.. etc. . . A subset of D is a dimension set for X, D X , if D X consists of properties of which it is natural (in every salient world w) for the generators of X w , the elements of gen(X w ), to have them.
By this we mean that the generators of X w are the kind of things that we distinguish in terms of whether they are big or small, red or green, etc. . .
X is individuated by dimension set D X if each property in D X
is a bipartition on gen(X w ), and the properties in D X jointly determine the partition into singletons: {{x}: x ∈ gen(X w )} (for every salient world w, and non-trivial regular set X w ).
The idea is that D X consists of natural properties, and enough of them, to tell the generators apart. Individuation is not counting: you can in-dividuate the generators of a noun denotation in w with natural properties, partition them into finegrained natural units down to the level of singletons, without ending up with non-overlapping objects.
But counting is itself individuation: we assume that generators that are made non-overlapping in context (i.e. count) are ipse facto individuated.
We give this the following form:
The extensional dimension set E X w is:
The set consisting of the property that a generator has if it is disjoint from all other generators.
-Noun intension X is [+I], individuated, iff there is a salient dimension D X which for every world w individuates X w (if X w is non-trivial). -We assume that E X , the extensional dimension set, is always salient.
We let X be [-I], non-individuated, if X is not individuated.
On this formalization, X w is individuated by E X iff X is count, and hence count entails individuated: [+C] ⇒ [+I]
We have now three features: [±C] , [±N] and [±I] . I will adopt a Two Feature System in which the structural notion neat (no overlapping minimal elements) and the more intensional notion individuated are taken to coincide:
Strong Mess Mass assumption: [+N] ⇔ [+I]
This is a constraint on noun intensions: we restrict the noun intensions available for the interpretation of natural language to those that satisfy the equivalence [+N] ⇔ [+I]. This makes no difference for count nouns, which are by definition neat and extensionally individuated, but the constraint says that when a mass noun has a neat denotation, its generators are interpreted as individuated by a salient (intensional) dimension set, and it says that when a mass noun has a mess interpretation, there is no natural salient dimension set individuating its generators.
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The Two Feature System gives the following set of features, which we assume to be lexically specified on nouns in English:
The theory makes the following natural distinctions:
And the hypothesis is that these contrasts are semantically robust, meaning that natural languages will cluster properties around these two boundaries, both within one language and cross-linguistically.
For 
THE ROBUSTNESS OF THE FEATURE [±N]
In this section I discuss four phenomena which show that the feature [±] is semantically robust.
The classifier stuks in Dutch.
Dutch has a classifier stuks with a meaning similar to the English head (as in head of cattle) but with a much wider use. Doetjes (1997) A caveat: as one can easily find out by searching the internet, workers in the catering branch do not, in their internet exchanges, distinguish very carefully between the classifier stuks (items) and the plural noun stukken (pieces). This means that they produce data which contradicts the data in (20): (23) a. Een bitter garnituur bestaat uit zes stuks worst, zes stuks kaas en zes stuks bitterballen. A meat roll dish consists of six items sausage, six items cheese and six items meat rolls This may be a linguistic innovation or sloppiness. Both for Doetjes, for me and my informants, (23a) is ungrammatical; its content should be expressed as (23b): (23) b. Een bitter garnituur bestaat uit zes stukjes worst, zes stukjes kaas en zes stuks bitterballen.
A meat roll dish consists of six pieces sausage, six pieces cheese and six items meat rolls I will ignore the internet innovation here. The classifier stuks takes neat nouns denotations as input and turns them into count noun denotations. How does it do this?
That depends on the semantics of the input noun. All neat nouns are individuated, but some are more individuated than others. Vee is a mass noun in Dutch, while cattle is a plural noun in English. There is no doubt, however, either in Dutch or in English, which elements count as the most elementary building blocks of vee: the heads of cattle. In this, vee is like prototypical count nouns.
[Vee means domesticated farm animals, live-stock, typically cows, sheep, goats, but also chickens (pluimvee/feathered live-stock). However, out of the blue, vee means cattle (and that's the only thing my pocket dictionary Dutch-English gives). Below, I will, for ease, translate vee as cattle, except where I explicitly mean live-stock.]
Rothstein (2010) uses the term inherently atomic for prototypical count nouns, to distinguish them from count nouns like fence. For inherently atomic neat mass nouns, the interpretation of stuks is the following:
Let X be an inherently atomic neat noun intension. For every world w: stuks(X w ) = < * (min(Xw)),min(Xw))> Stuks vee has the same denotation as the count noun phrase domesticated farm animals.
Neat nouns like kitchenware are less inherently atomic, in the sense that we saw above: in context, it is not automatically obvious whether something is meant to count as three or as one. In this case, we can assume that different choices are possible:
For regular set X, let V X be the set of all variants in X.
Let X be a neat noun intension which is not inherently atomic. In context k, let stuks k be a function which maps X and world w onto a set www.thebalticyearbook.org Mass Nouns 42 stuks k,X,w ∈ V X w , a variant for X w . We define, for context k and world w: stuksk(X w ) = < * stuks k,X,w , stuks k,X,w > In context k, we choose a variant of the generators of kitchenware, say, the pan, the teapot, and the cup and saucer, and let stuks keukenwaar denote the closure under sum of that set.
For inventory list counting contexts, we may want to count all the generators, not just a variant. In that case, we have to make the generators disjoint: Let ↑ (X) = {↑(x): x ∈ X}, with ↑ the packaging operation defined in section 9 below. Let X be a neat noun intension which is not inherently atomic. Let i be an inventory context.
This will package the generators that are pluralities as count atoms.
In all these cases, the resulting noun phrase is a count noun phrase, and COUNT is correct on its denotation.
Counting in Chinese.
The Dutch classifier stuks is very similar to Chinese individual classifiers, like the general individual classifier ge.
We follow Chierchia (1998) and Li (1983) The difference with Dutch, then, is that the class of [-C,+N] nouns in Chinese is much larger, and, by necessity, the classifier construction is fully productive. For most of these nouns, the first interpretation strategy given for stuks above-mapping the neat noun interpretation on the closure of its set of minimal elements-will be appropriate for Chinese ge as well.
Since ge requires a neat noun as input, we find the contrast in (25) For furniture in (27) we find exactly what we found for count nouns: (27a) expresses that the furniture generators, the pieces of furniture, are big. The big furniture in (27b) consists of the pieces of furniture that are individually big, like the sofa's and the pianola's. This reading is absent for mess mass nouns like meat in (28): (28a) does not mean that the meat-generators are big; (28b) does not mean that all big meat-generators are in the other fridge. (28a) means that the meat comes in the form of a big hunk, while (28b) means that the meat that is packaged in big hunks is in the other fridge. Big clearly does not distribute to the meat-generators: in the contexts of our meatcutting machine, the generators are all small. The small-big distinction is not a salient individuating dimension on meat generators, and in fact, applying distributive adjectives to mess mass nouns is, out of context, often not fully felicitous. The distributive adjectives are typically the ones that are naturally used as part of individuating dimension sets.
The question is: how do distributive adjectives distribute in the neat mass domain? In the count domain, the distributive operator is standardly regarded as a null version of the adverbial each. Now that we discover that there is distributivity in the (neat) mass domain, questions are raised about the connection between distributivity and each, because, of course, each cannot apply to mass nouns (#each furniture).
I propose that the connection with each is not given up. I assume that the distributive operator on neat noun denotations semantically shifts the neat noun denotation X to count interpretation stuks k (X), and distributes on the latter as usual:
Let X be a neat noun intension, for every world w and context k:
Note that the shift takes place as part of the meaning of big: we are not shifting the mass noun to a count noun. And, in fact, we assume that the result of applying big to X is a neat mass noun: the new set of generators is gen(X w ) ∩ * (gen(stuks k (X w )) ∩ big), the set of X generators that are sums of big stuks N, not simply the set of minimal elements gen(stuks k (X w )) ∩ big. (In fact, we can make it a requirement on felicitous application of big to X, that the result stay neat mass.) Hence for neat mass noun N, big N is a neat mass noun phrase, not a count noun phrase. But big distributes to the generators that count as 'stuks'.
For inherently atomic neat mass nouns like vee in Dutch, this means that in groot vee (big cattle), groot distributes to stuks vee, the minimal elements, the individual heads of cattle. This is as it should be.
For less inherently atomic neat nouns like kitchenware, we expect that big need not distribute to the minimal elements, like it does in vee: big distributes to stuks of kitchenware, but what counts as stuks of kitchenware is context dependent. Thus, the teapot, the pan, and the cup and saucer may all count as big, even though the cup itself and the saucer itself don't. Hence the distribution of big is predicted to be contextual in exactly the way that the interpretation of stuks (in Dutch) is contextual.
For the inventory reading, a bit more work will have to be done concerning the set of generators (because it is not necessarily a subset of gen(X w )). It is reasonable to assume it to be at least (gen(X) ∪ ↑(gen(X)) ∪ big. Here too we can make it a requirement that the interpretation of the complex stays neat mass.
In sum, big is distributive on neat nouns through classifier stuks k . This predicts that distributive adjectives treat inherently atomic neat nouns the same as count nouns (distribution to minimal elements), but other neat nouns show the distribution expected from their possible stuks k interpretations. Barner & Snedeker (2005) present experimental data to show that for children and adults neat nouns pattern with count nouns, when it comes to size comparisons: both compare in terms of cardinality. We expand upon this result in this section.
Neat comparison.
Barner and Snedeker's results have direct linguistic consequences for the semantics of most, which involved comparison. We give the examples in Dutch, because this will allow us to use the neat mass noun vee (cattle) .
We look at available readings for de meeste (most).
www.thebalticyearbook.org Barner and Snedeker's results show that the most prominent interpretation of the comparative in (32b) is similar to that of the comparative in (31b). Hence, the most prominent reading available for (32) is the counting reading: more = more in stuks = number of minimal elements.
I say 'the most prominent reading.' Let me be more precise: I think that the only counting reading available for (32) is the reading on which it is equivalent to (31), and hence counting is in terms of minimal elements. But this is for 'inherently atomic' neat mass nouns. For less inherently atomic neat mass nouns, the most prominent comparison is also in terms of counting generators, but in that case, this need not be necessarily minimal generators. pan is 12 euros. You cannot buy the cup separately, nor the saucer, and the teaset is just the teapot and the cup and saucer, no price differences there. Two items cost more than 5 euros, one item less, hence (33) is true. more = more in stuks k : not more in minimal generators, but in the choice of generators determined by stuks k
Situation 2:
In the neighbouring shop, the cup is 3 euros, the saucer is 3 euros, you pay 5.50 for the cup and saucer, the teapot is 6 euros, the teaset is 11 euros. In this shop, three items cost more than 5 euros, and 2 items less, (33) is true. more = more in stuks i , where i is an inventory context: more is more in terms of the whole set of generators, counting each generator independently as one.
We see that, as in the previous case of distribution, the comparison in the neat noun is in terms of stuks k . This gives the following semantics:
Let X be a neat noun intension [+N] . For every world w and context k:
MOST stuks (X w , P) = 1 iff |gen(stuks k (X w )) ∩ P| > |gen(stuks k (X w )) -P| For count nouns, gen(stuks(COWw)) = COW w , hence:
For inherently atomic neat noun vee, let us assume than in the context of our farm, the vee/live-stock consists of cows and chickens.
gen(stuks(VEE)) = COW ∪ CHICKEN. Let us set FA = COW ∪ CHICKEN. Then:
MOST stuks (VEE w , OUTSIDE w ) = 1 iff |FA OUTSIDE| > |FA -OUTSIDE| I said above that the counting reading in terms of stuks is the most prominent reading of neat mass nouns. I also said that for inherently atomic neat nouns it is the only counting reading. But it is not the only reading. This is a major reason why I am unhappy with Chierchia's (2010) classification of neat mass nouns as 'fake' mass nouns. Because neat mass nouns are not fake mass nouns, they are real mass nouns, and the evidence is that most can compare neat mass nouns in terms of the measures that are appropriate for mess mass nouns.
Suppose that there are cows and chickens, and the cows are kept outside, but the chickens are kept inside. The chickens outnumber the cows, but in terms of biomass and volume, there is less biomass and less volume of chicken. But this is not true in the examples in (34). In terms of cardinality, most farm animals are not kept outside, because there are more chickens than cows, and the chickens, unfortunately, are inside. Still, (34) is true, because the comparison can be in terms of biomass or volume.
Compare also (36) in English:
(36) a. In terms of volume, most live-stock is cattle. b. #In terms of volume, most farm animals are cattle.
(36b) is funny, and in as much as it is felicitous it is false in the above scenario. (36a), on the other hand, is true. We see, then, that the facts are in line with what Barner and Snedeker's experiments show, but they are more subtle. Counting comparison for neat nouns, like distributivity, is in terms of stuks k , hence counting comparison for neat nouns is only strictly identified with counting minimal generators for inherently atomic neat mass nouns. The counting comparison is more flexible and context dependent for less inherently atomic neat mass nouns.
Moreover, neat mass nouns are true mass nouns in that mass measure interpretations are available for most NOUN, if the noun is a neat mass noun; this is a real difference with count nouns: mass measure interpretations are completely unavailable for most NOUN if the noun is a count noun.
FUSION AND FISSION
I assume that packaging as an operation from mass entities to count entities is the same operation as group formation (as assumed in Landman 1991): a mass or count sum is treated as a count atom, more than the sum of its parts. But bringing in packages and groups simultaneously is more complex than I am willing to deal with here. So I deal only with packaging, and assume the following picture:
-The generator sets of mass predicates are subsets of the domain M.
-The generator sets of count predicates are disjoint subsets of C.
In honor of the fact that I assume one operation for packaging and group formation, I will give it a new name, and since the operation fuses a plurality into an atom, I will call it fusion:
Fusion is an injection from M-sums into atomic packages.
Fusion is identity on M-atoms Not every element of IND needs to be in ran(↑), the range of ↑. If fido is in IND, fido is not only more than the sum of his mass parts, but also more than the fusion of his mass parts. But there is an equivalence relation relating fido uniquely to the fusion of his mass parts:
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≈ is an equivalence relation on IND such that: for every a ∈ IND there is exactly one b ∈ IND such that b ≈ a and b ∈ ran(↑).
For a ∈ IND, we let a ≈ be the unique element of [a] ≈ such that a ≈ ∈ ran(↑).
This equivalence relation is used to relate fido to the sum of his M-parts.
Besides fusion, we have an operation that splits an IND atom into a plurality of M-elements, maps a set onto the sum of its splits, and a regular mass or count set onto the sum of the splits of its generators:
if X = <X,gen(X)> is a regular mass or count set
In terms of split, we define an operation of fission:
If fido is in IND, then the split of fido is the sum of fido's M-parts, and the fission of fido is the set of all Boolean parts of the split of fido:
Suppose the individual dogs are d 1 , d 2 and d 2 ∈ IND. Then:
). For each dog d i , go to the package of d i 's sum of M-parts, and go back to the corresponding sum of M-parts. Sum these parts together: that is the split of gen(DOG).
The fission of DOG, ↓(DOG), is the set of all Boolean parts of that split, and the fission of DOG, ↓(DOG), is the regular set consisting of ↓(DOG) and ↓(DOG)-{0} as set of generators. (37) a. There is human in this dish. b. There is cat in this soup. c. There was dog all over the wall.
FISSION READINGS
The cases in (37) Rothstein's account for Chinese is as follows: Chinese nouns are not specified for number, there is no number agreement between the copula and the noun, so the bare noun is grammatical in (38) and allows a plural interpretation. On the assumption that fission is a last-resort mechanism, it follows that (38) does not have a fission interpretation. Rothstein (2009a) argues that in Hebrew, as in Chinese, fission readings are not possible, but they can be triggered by a mismatch in grammatical gender between the copula and the post-copular bare noun. Cheng et al. (2008) With Rothstein's last resort assumption for fission readings, this predicts that food-stuff nouns have a mess mass reading in all three languages, but no fission reading.
What is the difference? In section 1 of this paper, I argued against homeopathic semantics for mess mass nouns like salt and triangle patterned wallpaper: mess mass nouns, I argued, do not have a homeopathic interpretation, there are lexical and contextual constraints on what counts as salt and on when the salt is becoming too small to be split into two parts that both count as salt.
On the other hand, in the previous section I gave a semantics for the fission interpretation of dog: ↓(DOG) = <(↓(DOG)], (↓(DOG)]-{0}>, the set of all Boolean parts of the split of the set of all individual dogs. This means that the fission interpretation of dog is homeopathic, www.thebalticyearbook.org Mass Nouns 56 in that it doesn't put constraints on what counts as fission dog, more than that it is mass part of the sum of all dogs.
The prediction, then, is that fission readings are homeopathic, closed under arbitrary mass parts. For fission readings, like those in (37a,b) repeated here, what there has to be in the dish/soup to make the statement true can be manipulated in context to an extreme degree: (40) a. There is human in this dish. b. There is cat in this soup.
Thus, normally you will utter (37a,b) if you detect human flesh in the dish or cat flesh in the soup. But I may say (37b) with disapproval if I find a piece of fingernail in the dish, or fish a cat hair out of my soup.
In a mythological context, if I, to test the Wisdom of the Gods, take something from the body of Pelops, so small that we ordinary humans would not be able to detect it, still in the Myth, Zeus will thunder at me: there is human in this dish, and condemn me to the Tartarus. Thus, in context, certain parts may be regarded as too small to be considered as parts that matter, but the context can be manipulated (as in the Zeus example) to include arbitrarily small parts. And the flexibility here can be extreme.
Suppose Harold comes into the kitchen, proudly shows us the gall stone they have removed from him, and drops it by accident in the soup. You fish it out and I say: (41) I am not going to eat that soup, it has had Harold in it. This is, of course, funny, but so are all the other fission examples, and the thing that gets stretched in this example is: 'what counts as a contextually relevant part of Harold. Lexical mass nouns are not homeopathic. In order for (41) to be true, there has to be meat in the soup and not just something that is part of the meat.
(41) There is meat in the soup. For instance, in the near future white calf-meat may come on the market that consists 70% of hormones. Suppose I extract the hormones from calf-meat, put them in a jar, and make a soup for the yearly dinner party of the Body-builders Club, and I scoop a considerable amount of these hormones into the soup.
The vegetarians among the body-builders may regard the soup as not suited for them, because not only do they not eat meat, but they also try not to eat additives for the production of which animals have been killed. Yet, this doesn't mean that (41) is true. For (41) to be true there has to be meat in the soup, and not just a set of chemicals derived from a meat source.
The difference between these two cases is instructive. The lexical mass nouns, by their meaning, put constraints on their denotation: if something is in the denotation of meat, only those of its parts are in the denotation of meat that themselves satisfy the criteria for counting as meat.
Fission interpretations, as we have seen, are different: there are no other lexical constraints for being in the denotation of the fission of dog than being part of the split of dogs, and contextual salience. This shows that if you think (which I don't) that count nouns like dog have mess mass interpretations, or interpretations unspecified for count and mass, like Pelletier's interpretations, or Rothstein's root-noun interpretations, these interpretations are different from fission interpretations. The reason for this is that a mess mass interpretation or root interpretation would put semantic constraints on the noun denotation, lexical constraints, and that is just what we don't find for fission interpretations.
We now look at (42):
(42) There is apple in the salad.
Again, genetically modified apples may come on the market that consist 70% of hormones, the same hormones as contained in the calfmeat. At the same dinner, I mix the apple-derived hormones into the salad. Just as (41) is not true, (42) is not true. For (42) to be true, it is not enough that there is part of the apples in the salad, it has to be part that itself counts as apple. Thus, apple patterns with mess mass nouns like meat, suggesting strongly that also in English, foodstuff nouns like apple are ambiguous between a count interpretation and a mess mass interpretation. Now look at the examples in (43) If I grate a winter-carrot and put the result in the salad, (46b) is perfectly felicitous, but (46a) is terrible: (46a) just cannot mean that there is stuff derived from the split of big carrots in the salad.
This strongly supports the distinctions made here and argues strongly against theories in which fission is a simple operation lifting the count nature of the noun, semantically doing not much more than removing a bit of contextual restriction. On such a theory, there is no rationale whatsoever for the contrast between (46a) and (46b).
THE NEATNESS OF FISSION READINGS
The problem.
The fission interpretation of count nouns like dog as ↓(DOG) has a problem, as can be observed in the picture in section 9: ↓(DOG) is mass all right, but it is also neat. The reason is that BOOL is a complete atomic Boolean algebra, and ↓(DOG) is closed downwards, hence min(↓(DOG)) = atom(↓(DOG)), and hence min(↓(DOG)) is disjoint. Now we have been assuming the Two Feature System, in which the features neat and individuated coincide. If so, it follows that the fission interpretation of dog, ↓(DOG), is individuated. But that means that the fission interpretation should allow distributive adjectives like small and big, with interpretations that distribute to the neat (individuated) generators. This means that we predict that (43a) We can move from the Two Feature System to a Three Feature System. In such a system, we do not make the assumption that the generators of neat nouns are necessarily individuated. (We do continue to make the mess mass assumption: [-N] ⇒ [-I], i.e. mess is non-individuated.) In the Three Feature System we have the following categories:
In this theory, there is a new category, [+N,-I], with neat minimal generators that are not individuated. Fission interpretations are of this category, but lexical nouns are not. It is certainly possible to work in such a theory, but it is also a bit disappointing. The Two Feature System has a conceptual elegance that the Three Feature System lacks: in the Two Feature System the semantically relevant features are all defined in terms of the conceptual algebra of part-of structures: part-of, minimal element, generator, overlap, sum, remainder,. . . The theory can do without the feature which has the more complex, intensional definition (individuated), because the two are identified extensionally. If it turns out that we can't maintain the equivalence, we have to accept that, of course, but it would be attractive if we don't have to.
Also, empirically, we have this new linguistically relevant category [-C, +N, -I], which is not lexically inhabited in any language I know of. And the question is: why not? Why aren't there languages where there are lexical nouns of the category [-C, +N, -I]?
Fission k .
An obvious alternative is to change the fission operation, which produces a neat set, to an operation whose output is mess, not neat. This is simple enough to do: let context k select a subset of fission ↓ k (X) of ↓(X):
where: 1. ↓ k (X) is a regular set 2. ↓ k (X) ⊆ ↓(X) 3. ⊔(↓ k (X)) = ⊔(↓(X)) 4. gen(↓ k (X)) is a set of overlapping generators for ↓ k (X) This is illustrated in the following picture: Easy as it is, this proposal has a major drawback: it makes ↓ k (DOG) a pretty normal mess mass noun. And that is a problem. We have just seen that fission interpretations differ from mess mass interpretations, so it is not clear how the differences we have discussed would be maintained in such a theory.
Super fission.
Fission breaks down an object into its homeopathic mass set, a neat Boolean algebra. That is, the arguments that we have given, following Chierchia (1998) , against atomless structures concerned the interpretations of lexical mass nouns: mess mass nouns and neat mass nouns. But that is not what we are talking about here at all, here we are talking about the question of whether the whole structure should be generated from a background set of 'ultimate atoms', and whether fission stops at those 'ultimate atoms'.
I propose an operation of super fission, which is fission that doesn't stop at the contextually provided postulated atoms in M, but breaks open such atoms.
We extend out interpretation domain BOOL to an interpretation domain UNIVERSE: UNIVERSE = <BOOL, SMASH>where:
1. BOOL is, as before, a complete atomic Boolean algebra with atoms sorted into M-atoms and IND.
2. SMASH is a complete atomless Boolean algebra such that: The idea of superfission is that the constraints on what counts as a salient part of the superfission of the dogs are not given by the structure at all. It is only the context that decides whether something that is part in the widest sense of the split of dogs is salient enough to count as a contextually salient fission part. Using an atomless structure is to remind us that the background atoms of the structure M do not form a semantic constraint on the fission interpretation. With this, the feature N now has three values: What about abstract mass nouns? Abstract mass nouns are all but absent in formal accounts of the semantics of mass nouns, and it is high time that their semantic properties are studied rigorously. I cannot at this point speculate about how they will fit into a theory like the one developed here. I do not know what the generators of love are (although love has arithmetic properties, as argued by Cordelia in the first scene of King Lear). I do not know whether denotations of abstract mass nouns are always atomic. Tarski, for one, would make a case that the mass interpretations of the abstract nouns space and time should be superfine, because Tarski developed the theory of atomless Boolean algebras and their standard model in the set of regular open sets as the natural background structure for three dimensional geometry.
In sum: the arguments against atomless structures concerned the interpretations of lexical mass and count nouns (excluding abstract nouns). Those arguments are accepted and maintained in the present theory. We maintain the Two Feature System, in which the intensional notion individuated is extensionally equated with the structural notion neat.
We spotted a problem: we must regard fission interpretations as not neat. But fission interpretations are not mess. We propose that, since fission interpretations are not lexically constrained anywaywhich means that they are not constrained in terms of requirements on their generators-we can as well make these interpretations ignore the atoms that the model BOOL forces upon them, and hence make them atomless. This paper has shown an exceptionally long and tortuous gestation process. The idea to look in the semantics of mass nouns horizontally at overlapping variants, rather than vertically at whether atoms are there, developed in the course of a graduate seminar on mass nouns that I taught at Tel Aviv University in the spring of 2001.
In the years that followed, I rewrote the material into a new version about every two years. However, what I was writing turned out to be more and more a kind of post-modernistic paper, consisting solely of section-long footnotes to a non-existing running text. And the problem is: I don't use footnotes, so ultimately, the more I wrote, the more it became the deconstruction rather than construction of a paper.
A good indication of the problems I had in formulating what the paper was about, is that-though versions of the paper were circulating-I didn't know how to give a talk about it. I thank all the audiences of these presentations for their comments, criticisms and discussions (or in some cases for their own presentations); here I especially want to mention Roberlei Alvez Bertucci, Greg Carlson, Edit Doron, Alex Grosu, Manfred Krifka, Xu Ping Li, Anna Müller, Barbara Partee, Jef Pelletier, Roberta Pires de Oliveira, Dafna Rothstein Landman and Frank Veltman. Once more thanks to Barbara for her helpful comments on the final written version of this paper. This www.thebalticyearbook.org Mass Nouns 66 paper owes an obvious intellectual debt to Gennaro Chierchia.
Susan Rothstein reminded me that, when, in Genesis, Adam gives names to the animals, he doesn't have, as the Hebrew formulates it, 'a help against him'. In the next line God makes him fall asleep, takes a rib, etc. . . Over the last ten years, Susan Rothstein has been this paper's 'help against it'. Without her it probably wouldn't have come into existence. Susan's penetrating comments, her own work as it developed simultaneously, her dis-and encouragements alternatingly shocked it into stasis, and into feverish stages of speedy development. In the end, very little in this paper would be the way it is without her.
